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Congressional action is needed to correct the inequities that exist
in the law as a result of the Jackson decision. It is suggested that dis-
crimination among the states would be avoided to some degree by
the adoption of a provision allowing a deduction for allowances reason-
ably required and actually expended, subject to a limitation on the
amount that may be deducted." Until Congress sees fit to change
this situation by federal legislation, the only relief available is at the
state level through enactment of statutes providing that the right to
a widow's allowance indefeasibly vests upon the decedent's death.
John David Tobin, Jr.
Legislative Note-Federal Taxation-
Oil and Gas De-Aggregations
I. INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas, like other natural deposits, is a wasting asset. When
it is removed from its natural state, the original amount available is
depleted. In order to provide for this reduction, the law permits a
deduction in computing taxable income earned from the removal.
One of the purposes of this deduction is to allow the owner of a
depletable asset to recover his capital investment tax-free, and to tax
only the income therefrom. For example, when oil is taken from a
well and sold, the well is being depleted and a part of the proceeds
from the sale represents a return of capital investment rather than
of income.
In the case of mineral properties, depletion allowances are com-
puted either by the cost depletion method or the percentage depletion
method.' Both cost and percentage depletion computations should be
the allowance to be terminable in the California and Georgia cases. The allowances terminate
in those two states upon the death or remarriage of the widow. Both are situations which
are incapable of determination either at the time of the decedent's death or at the time of
the court award. In Texas, the contingencies which may defeat the widow's right to an
allowance are finally determinable from facts in existence at the spouse's death. It is im-
material that the existence of these facts are recognized in a subsequent court award.
" A limitation on the amount allowed as a deduction will avoid the discrimination that
Congress found to exist under § 812(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. See note 2
supra. The suggested provision would re-establish the criteria for a deduction that existed
under the 1939 code. See note 2 supra.
'For an excellent analysis of the history of legislative developments in this area see
Freeman, Percentage Depletion for Oil-A Policy Issue, 30 Ind. L.J. 399, 404-11 (1955).
See also Blaise, What Every Tax Man Should Know About Percentage Depletion, 36 Taxes
395, 417-26 (1958); Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 Harv.
L. Rev, 1441, 1458-65 (1960); Kent, Tax Problems Affecting Lessors and Royalty Owners,
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made for each particular mineral property' because the computation
producing the larger deduction is allowed and is used to reduce the
basis of the property for future calculations. The cost depletion deduc-
tion is computed by dividing the adjusted basis of the property by the
number of units, i.e., barrels of oil, remaining to be recovered, and
multiplying this quotient by the number of units sold during the
period. The percentage depletion deduction, in the case of oil and
gas, is computed as twenty-seven and one-half per cent of the gross
income from the property, not to exceed fifty per cent of the taxable
income from the property.' Therefore, the definition of the property
is of vital significance in determining the depletion deduction avail-
able.
An oil and gas "property" for depletion purposes is defined as each
separate interest owned by the taxpayer in each mineral deposit in
each separate tract or parcel of land.' For purposes of this definition,
a tract or parcel of land' may be separated either geographically or
by conveyancing.' A tract also may be separated by a lease, sub-
lease or sale of an interest in the tract. Assume, for example, that the
owner of an entire block of land leases, sub-leases or sells a portion
of such block. A separate interest is thereby created for each portion
so transferred. Historically, each such separate mineral interest has
been treated as a separate property.'
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, through administrative
Southwestern Legal Foundation, First Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
355, 361-68 (1949).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, SS 611-613.
'Treas. Reg. 5 1.611-2 (1960).4 Treas. Reg. 5 1.613-2 (1960).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(a). This is the same definition given by the Treasury in
rulings issued under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. Bull.
245, modified by G.C.M. 24094, 1944-1 Cum. Bull. 250. However, this definition actually
evolved from the opinions in Vinton Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.
1934); J. T. Sneed, Jr., 40 B.T.A. 1136 (1939); and Allie M. Turbeville, 31 B.T.A. 283
(1934).
0 The term tract or parcel of land means an area delineated by metes and bounds, lot
the block description or otherwise. Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1 (a) (3) (1961).
For example, tracts are separated geographically if the taxpayer acquires a lease cover-
ing two tracts which do not have at least one common side, i.e., the tracts are joined at a
corner. Tracts are separated by conveyancing if the taxpayer acquires an interest in a tract
from one grantor and another interest in the same tract from another grantor. In both of
these instances, the taxpayer has acquired two properties. The acquisition of noncontiguous
tracts in a single transaction creates a separate property for each such area acquired, and
the acquisition of separate interests in the same tract from different grantors creates a
property for each interest acquired.
8 See note 5 supra.
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rulings' and regulations,"° a taxpayer was permitted to combine prop-
erties for depletion purposes, if they were located in a single tract or
parcel of land. The regulations provided as follows: "The taxpayer's
interest in each separate mineral property is a separate 'property';
but, where two or more mineral properties are included in a single
tract or parcel of land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral prop-
erties may be considered to be a single 'property,' provided such treat-
ment is consistently followed."'" Also, as a general rule, each lease was
considered to be a separate tract or parcel of land. A new concept,
however, was established by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a
which permitted the combination or aggregation of properties across
lease lines if all the properties were in one operating unit."3 These
rules provided that it was not necessary for purposes of the aggrega-
tion that the separate operating mineral interests be included in a
single tract or parcel of land, or in contiguous tracts or parcels of
land, so long as the interests were a part of the same operating unit."
Only one aggregation could be formed within each operating unit,
however, and this aggregation was not required to include all of the
interests within the operating unit." The definition of an operating
unit was to be determined for each taxpayer on the basis of his in-
dividual operations." Thus, the taxpayer could aggregate two or more
separate operating mineral interests and treat them as one property,
regardless of whether such interests were located in tracts or parcels
of land which were contiguous or in close proximity to each other,
but was required to treat as a separate property each such interest in
the operating unit that he did not include in the combination. The
9 See note 5 supra.
"°Treas. Reg. 118, 5 39.23(m)-1(i) (1953).
"1 Ibid.
12 This new concept did not change the definition of property which had been estab-
lished under the 1939 Code. However, it did provide that separate properties or mineral de-
posits could be treated as one property under the regulations provided that certain condi-
tions existed and the proper elections were made. Tnt. Rev. Code of 1954., ch. 736, § 614(b),
(c), and (d), 68A Stat. 210 (1954). This area of natural resources legislation has been
the subject of much controversy. The readers further review is directed to Fiske, Dehletion
Problems: The Unit of Property, Aggregating Property Interests, 10 Oil & Gas Tax Q.
66 (1961); Fiske, The "Property" Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 4 Oil & Gas
Tax Q. 254 (1957); French, The Oil and Gas Property and Aggregation, 36 Texas L. Rev.
745 (1958), merely to mention a few.
a Operating unit referred to mineral interests operated together for production purposes.
Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c) (1961) provided that the following factors would serve to in-
dicate that the mineral interests were operated as a unit:
i) common field or operating personnel,
ii) common supply and maintenance facilities,
iii) common processing or treatment plants, and
iv) common storage facilities.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 614(b)(1), 68A Stat. 210 (1954).
'5 Ibid.
"
0Treas. Reg. 5 1.614-2(c) (1961).
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passage of this legislation was intended primarily to benefit the hard
minerals industry," but the provisions applied equally to the oil and
gas industry. The Technical Amendments Act of 195818 continued
the rules established under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and,
in addition, provided oil and gas producers with an option for each
operating unit to use the operating unit rules or to return to the rules
which had been in effect under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,"
i.e., combining properties within a single tract or parcel of land.
As a result of the broad language used in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, oil and
gas producers were able to combine any number of oil and gas leases
provided that they were in a single operating unit, a term which
prior to these amendments had no fixed meaning in the oil and gas
industry."' Certain oil and gas producers 1 were able to increase sub-
stantially their depletion deductions through a careful combinaton of
properties for tax purposes. This objective was accomplished by com-
bining high net income properties with low net income properties,
which were affected by the fifty per cent of taxable income limita-
tion, so that the overall percentage depletion deduction on the ag-
gregation more closely approximated the full twenty-seven and one-
half per cent of gross income."" Of course, those properties upon
1 This legislation followed a series of Tax Court decisions which held that producers
of hard minerals were permitted to treat an entire mine or several mines as a single property
even though the mine or mines covered a number of tracts of land. For example, see Buffalo
Chilton Coal Co., 20 T.C. 398 (1953); Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 13 T.C. 448 (1949);
Amherst Coal Co., 11 T.C. 209 (1948), nonacq. 1949-1 Cum. Bull.; and Black Mountain
Corp., 5 T.C. 1117 (1945), nonacq. 1946-2 Cum. Bull.
"s72 Stat. 1633 (1958), adding Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(c).
" Many producers were desirous of returning to the rules which had been in effect under
the 1939 Code. In this regard, see Johnson, 1958 Amendment to Subchapter I (Natural
Resources) Affecting Oil and Gas Interests, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Tenth Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 493 (1959); Schoenbaum, Mineral "Prop-
erty" as Defined by Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 8 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 13 (1958).
20 See notes 13-17 supra.
2 At first blush, this amendment appears to be advantageous only to the very large oil
and gas producers who have widespread holdings. However, further analysis will indicate to
the reader that any producer with more than one lease could aggregate his properties, pro-
vided that he met the necessary conditions. For an excellent article on this subject see
Williams, Aggregation of Natural Resources Properties, 11 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 198 (1962),
particularly pages 203-208 where the author discusses the various advantages and disad-
vantages of aggregations under a variety of fact situations.
2 Assume an operator owns properties A and B and realizes $100,000 gross income from
each. However, property A shows a net income of $80,000 and property B shows a net
income of $40,000. As separate properties, although 27 27% of the gross income from each
property equals $27,500 for a total of $55,000, the allowable depletion is limited to $47,500
because the depletion allowed on property B is limited to 50% of the net income of
$40,000, or $20,000. If these two properties had been aggregated so as to have been treated
as a single property, there would have been no net income limitation on depletion. The total
gross income would have been $200,000, which at 27 4% would produce depletion of
$55,000. The aggregated net income would have been $120,000 and 5o% of such net income
would be $60,000, or $5,000 in excess of the percentage depletion allowable. Therefore, the
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which cost depletion was higher than percentage depletion would be
excluded from the aggregation.
The Treasury objected to aggregations primarily on two grounds."
First, it was administratively difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine an operating unit which was mutually agreeable to both the
taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayer sought
to use the largest possible units in order to achieve combinations of
properties over extremely widespread and naturally advantageous
areas, and the Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, attempted
to curb such an approach. Second, the Treasury felt that the law
provided an unintended tax advantage"4 to oil and gas producers by
permitting them an unusual amount of freedom to combine prop-
erties, primarily for tax rather than business purposes, and thereby
to obtain a maximum depletion allowance.
With this historical background of apparently frustrated legis-
lative intent before it, and at the insistence of the Treasury Depart-
ment"' and President Kennedy," Congress eliminated the operating
unit aggregation rule for oil and gas properties and established rules
which it thought to be more in accord with business procedures.
aggregation of the two properties would have increased the taxpayer's depletion deduction
by t7.500.
23S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1964).
" An analysis such as this may have identified a result of the prior legislation; however,
it also uncovers a much more complex problem which the Treasury has apparently chosen
to ignore. At the time of its enactment, the operating-unit concept of aggregations created
a very small economic impact on Treasury revenues-e.g., domestic exploration was ap-
proaching its peak, production allowables were at or near maximum capacity, and percentage
depletion, in general, was based on 27Y,4% of gross income rather than s0% of net income.
In the latter part of 1957, however, foreign import oil began to become a serious competi-
tive factor to domestic producers because of the Government's position in regard to such
imports. As a result of this influx of foreign oil, the various state authorities began a con-
sistent cutting back of allowable producing days so that more properties became marginal
operations and the advantages of the operating-unit concept of aggregations became more
apparent. Faced with these increasing problems, the domestic producers were required to
spread out their operations in order to devise more economic production methods-e.g.,
field or operating personnel were required to cover a larger geographical area and provide
common supply and maintenance facilities. Thus, these business considerations provided a
greater base for determining those properties which could be aggregated and operated to-
gether for the purpose of producing minerals. As a result of these economic factors, the 50%
of net income limitation on percentage depletion had to be considered and the aggregation
of marginal properties with high income producing properties became a tax advantage.
25S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also Hearings Before the Committee
on Ways and Means on Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in his Message
Transmitted to Congress January 24, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), in particular the
statement of Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, and the questions by members of
the Committee addressed to Mr. Dillon beginning on page 38. In this same regard, the ad-
versary position is ably presented by Robert J. Casey, counsel for Union Pacific Railroad
Company, on page 3969 and by Texaco on page 4026.
s" Special message to Congress recommending tax reduction and reforms by President
John F. Kennedy, January 24, 1963, 109 Cong. Rec. 919 (1963).
NOTES
III. 1964 REVENUE ACT
Section 226 of the Revenue Act of 1964" makes material changes
in the property unit rules relating to the grouping of oil and gas
operating interests for depletion purposes."' The effect of the new
rules is to eliminate the operating-unit concept of aggregation of
mineral interests formerly provided in section 614 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954" and to return, with the exception of uniti-
zation of such interests, to the lease concept in effect under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939,"° with several modifications and
clarifications.
A. Aggregation Of Interests
The new rules state that an owner of oil and gas operating interests
cannot aggregate such interests, as a general rule, beyond the bounda-
ries of each separate lease.3' Further, all operating interests within a
separate tract or parcel of land are combined and treated as one
property,' unless an election is made to treat such interests as sepa-
rate properties.' The result is that an operating interest in one tract
of land cannot be combined with an operating interest in another
tract. Of course, as under prior law,'4 an operating interest cannot
be combined with a nonoperating interest, whether in the same or
another tract or parcel of land.
If a taxpayer owns all or any portion of the operating rights in a
tract or parcel of land, but has made expenditures for the develop-
ment or operation of only a single operating mineral interest in the
tract, a subsequently acquired or discovered operating mineral inter-
est in the same tract will be combined with the original interest unless
a timely election is made to separate the two interests." On the other
hand, if several operating mineral interests in the same tract or parcel
of land are owned during the first year for which elections are required
under the new provisions, the taxpayer may elect to treat one or
more or all of his interests as separate, but may not have more than
one combination in a single tract." If the taxpayer elects to treat one
or more interests in the same tract as separate properties, his remain-
2778 Stat. 94 (1964).
:a Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614.
9 See notes 31-33 infra.
a See notes 10 and 11 supra.
3t Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (1) (B), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
31 Tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (I) (A), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (2), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
'
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b) (1961).




ing interests in that tract are automatically combined and treated as
a single property." The election must be made for the first taxable
year beginning after December 31, 1963, and once made the election
is binding for all future years."
If an election is in effect for any year when the taxpayer acquires
an additional interest or discovers a new deposit in the same tract,
he has an additional election as to the new interest or deposit."9 If all
interests in the tract have been treated as separate properties, the
new interest or deposit shall be considered a separate property unless
the taxpayer elects to combine it with another interest in the same
tract." If, however, there is a combination of interests in the tract,
the new interests will be considered to be a part of such combination
unless the taxpayer elects to treat it as a separate property.
The new rules do not provide an election to separate interests which
originally were combined under the 1939 Code rules. Instead, they
provide that these combinations will be recognized and treated as
combinations of properties under the new rules and cannot be sepa-
rated by an election."' However, the election to combine or keep
separate subsequently discovered or acquired interests in the same
tract will apply to such combinations."' Aggregations previously
formed under the 1954 Code rules must be discontinued and sepa-
rated into their component mineral interests. The taxpayer may then
elect to treat these interests as separate properties or to combine them
according to the new rules."
B. Allocation Of Basis
The new rules state that the taxpayer must allocate the total basis
of the aggregation to the separated interests by one of two methods.
The first method, the fair market value method," provides that the
allocation must be made in the ratio that the fair market value of
each property bears to the total fair market value of the aggregation.
For many taxpayers the use of this method as the basis for dissolving
existing aggregations will create an extremely difficult valuation prob-
lem involving many properties." The alternative, the allocation of
37 Ibid.
I'lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (4), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
aInt. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (2), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
'°Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (2) (A), as amended, 78 Star. 94 (1964).
'I Tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (2) (B), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (5), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (2), as amended, 78 Star. 94 (1964).
44 See notes 31-33 supra.
"The Revenue Act of 1964, § 226(c) (1), 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
"' There is also a distinct possibility that this method of de-aggregation could lead to
a potential loss of cost depletion. Assume for example, that the taxpayer has been required
to aggregate two properties-i.e., property A with a high cost basis, but which proves to
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adjustments method,' provides that the taxpayer may ascribe to
each property the basis which it had prior to the aggregation, adjusted
by its share of depletion and other items reasonably attributable to
it during the time the aggregation was in existence. The use of this
method for de-aggregating properties will require a difficult appor-
tionment, between the various properties, of depletion taken during
the existence of the aggregation. Such an apportionment will be im-
possible unless the taxpayer's records are adequate because a separate
election is necessary for each aggregation.' If the existing aggrega-
tions affected by these provisions have no basis remaining to allocate,
as well may be the case, then the problems incident to the use of
this method will be academic. The total basis of the separated prop-
erties cannot, however, regardless of the method used, exceed the
adjusted basis of the aggregation prior to its dissolution. As is appar-
ent, the discontinuance and dissolution of presently existing aggrega-
tions will create complex problems for many taxpayers.
C. Pooled Or Unitized Interests
With regard to operating mineral interests that are pooled or
unitized, the new rules make an exception to the general rule estab-
lished for determining the property unit.' The rules state that all the
taxpayer's operating interests in a unitized or pooled area shall be
treated as a single property so long as they remain in the unitization
or pooling."° If, however, they are later removed from the unitiza-
tion or pooling, they resume whatever status they had prior to such
contribution." This provision applies to all compulsory unitizations?
have low production and low reserves so that percentage depletion is always smaller than
cost depletion; and property B with a low cost basis, but which proves to have high produc-
tion and high reserves so that percentage depletion will always be in excess of cost deple-
tion. Obviously, when the aggregation is discontinued, property B will have a higher fair
market value than property A and will require a higher adjusted basis. In all likelihood,
both properties will continue to produce at such a level that they will retain their old
characteristics as to the depletion deduction, but property A will have a considerably smaller
basis upon which to compute cost depletion and a certain amount of such depletion will
have been lost. This is the same method, however, that has been followed by the Treasury
if a taxpayer sells his interest in a presently existing aggregation. Treas. Reg. S 1.614-6(a) (2)
(1961), provides that if a portion of the aggregated property is disposed of, then an alloca-
tion of total costs between the portion disposed of and the portion retained on the basis
of their relative fair market value at the date of disposition is required.
" The Revenue Act of 1964, S 226(c) (2), 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
" However, a taxpayer may use the fair market value rule for some aggregations and
the allocation of adjustments rule for others.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (3), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
°Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 614(b) (3) (A), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
Ibid.
s Compulsory unitization is the combination, as required by law, of separately owned
interests into a unit constituting all or part of a producing pool or reservoir and the
jint operation of such unit.
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and to a voluntary unitization"" if the interests covered by the uniti-
zation agreement are in the same deposit or are in two or more de-
posits, the joint development of which is logical from the standpoint
of geology, convenience, economy or conservation, and are in tracts
or parcels of land which are contiguous or in close proximity." The
practical result of this new section is to overrule several cases in which
the courts allowed the taxpayer, who contributed both high-basis and
low-basis properties to a unitization, to maintain the contributed
properties separate and thereby obtain a higher depletion allowance."
However, the section further provides that if a property was unitized
before 1964, and the taxpayer treated his interests in such unitization
as two or more separate properties, then he may continue to do so
provided that such treatment is ultimately upheld as proper under the
prior rules."
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the new rules are similar to the rules and administrative
practices under the 1939 Code, there are several principal differences
and distinctions which should be noted. First, the treatment under
the 1939 Code provided that each mineral interest in a tract or parcel
of land was treated as a separate property unless the taxpayer elected
to combine such interests. 7 By contrast, under the Revenue Act of
1964, the taxpayer is deemed to have combined all of his mineral
interests in a separate tract or parcel of land unless he elects to treat
such interests as separate properties. Thus, the 1939 Code rules pro-
vided for a maximum number of properties in each tract absent
affirmative action on the part of the taxpayer, and the 1964 Revenue
Act treatment provides for a minimum number of properties under
the same circumstances. Second, the 1939 Code rules required that
the election necessary to combine mineral properties must be made
' Voluntary unitization is the development and operation of an oil pool or reservoir
as a unit, involving the consolidation or merger of all interests in the pool and the desig-
nation of one or more of the parties as operator for the benefit of all the owners, per
their mutual agreement. In this regard, see French, Natural Resources Regulations, N.Y.U.
20th Institute on Fed. Tax. 1147, 1175-82 (1962).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (3) (B), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
" This paradox was created by providing that the taxpayer could take percentage de-
pletion on one property and cost depletion on another property, although both properties
were included in the unitization, by allocating a portion of his share of the unitized oil
production to each property. See Winfield Killam, 39 T.C. 680 (1963); Earl V. Whitwell,
28 T.C. 372 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958); Belridge Oil
Co., 27 T.C. 1044 (1957), nonacq. 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 7, aff'd, 267 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1959).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (3) (C), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
57 See note 10 supra.
"s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 614(b) (1) and (2), as amended, 78 Stat. 94 (1964).
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